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Children’s Health in a Legal Framework
Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott
Summary
The U.S. legal system gives parents the authority and responsibility to make decisions about 
their children’s health care, and favors parental rights over society’s collective responsibility to 
provide for children’s welfare. Neither the federal government nor state governments have an 
affirmative obligation to protect and promote children’s health, nor do children have a right to 
such protection. In this sense, write Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott, policies to promote 
child health in this country, such as those discussed elsewhere in this issue, are optional. 
Our libertarian legal framework grants parents broad authority to raise their children as they 
see fit. Parents can refuse recommended medical treatment for their children, and when 
they do so, courts respond with deference, particularly when parents’ objections are based on 
religious beliefs. Parental authority has its limits, however. For example, the government can 
intervene to protect children’s welfare in cases of medical neglect or when the child’s life is 
in danger. Additionally, the law sometimes limits parental authority over older children. For 
example, teenagers may be able to refuse some treatments, such as psychiatric hospitalization, 
over their parents’ objections. Older minors may also have access to treatments such as family 
planning services without their parents’ consent.
Because the government has no positive obligation to promote children’s health, write 
Huntington and Scott, children’s health programs are often underfunded and vulnerable to 
political pressure. Programs are also more likely to focus on responding to family crises than 
on helping parents raise healthy children. In this environment, policy makers, researchers, and 
advocates must build political support by showing that investments in children’s health not 
only benefit children but also promote social welfare.
www.futureofchildren.org
Clare Huntington is a professor at the Fordham University School of Law. Elizabeth Scott is a professor at Columbia Law School.
Mark Courtney of the University of Chicago reviewed and critiqued a draft of this article.
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In the United States, parents have primary responsibility for their children’s health and have a corre-sponding right to make health-care decisions for their children. This 
parental power, however, is not absolute. 
Under its police power, the state can some-
times override parental rights to promote 
social welfare: thus, for example, the state 
can require that children be vaccinated 
against disease.1 The state can also pro-
tect the welfare of individual children, if, 
for example, their parents act in ways that 
threaten their health. Parental rights are 
qualified in another way as well. Lawmakers 
have authorized adolescents to make some 
health-care decisions without involving their 
parents. Pregnant minors have a limited right 
to obtain abortions and, in many states, birth 
control treatment is available to teenag-
ers.2 Finally, although not a legal exception, 
in practice the government tends to defer 
less to the parental rights of low-income 
parents and to condition public assistance 
on considerable intrusion into the family. 
The legal system deals very differently with 
most families, whose parental rights are 
strongly protected, and low-income fami-
lies, whose parental rights may receive little 
consideration. 
In this legal regime based on parental rights, 
the state has the power to limit parental 
authority, but it has no affirmative obliga-
tion to help parents care for their children’s 
health needs unless it undertakes to do so, 
as with Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP). Moreover, the 
government’s deference to parents may deter 
the state from providing useful services and 
support.
An important implication of the United 
States’ approach to children’s health and 
wellbeing is that efforts to improve children’s 
health must be undertaken within the reality 
of this libertarian framework. The U.S. legal 
framework is germane to the other articles 
in this issue because it demonstrates that 
any policy proposal should be understood as 
optional from the state’s perspective. It also 
underscores the need to develop political 
support for any initiative to improve health 
services for children. Often, as this article 
shows, the state intervenes to promote 
children’s health only in response to com-
pelling social welfare needs such as reduc-
ing teenage pregnancy, juvenile crime, and 
communicable diseases, or to crises in which 
parents abuse their children or fail to provide 
adequate care.
In this article, we flesh out the legal frame-
work that shapes and constrains children’s 
health policy under American law. We focus 
first on parental rights doctrine under con-
stitutional and statutory law, its justification, 
and the limits of parental rights. We exam-
ine an important conflict between parental 
rights and the state’s interest in children’s 
health involving cases where parents’ reli-
gious beliefs deter them from seeking medi-
cal treatment for their children. We then 
explore the policy implications of the liber-
tarian framework, explaining that because no 
support for families is legally mandated, the 
libertarian framework encourages a reactive 
approach to child wellbeing based on crisis 
intervention rather than prevention. Finally, 
we examine adolescent health policy, an area 
where the law has sometimes departed from 
the parental rights approach, first by giving 
adolescents authority to make some treat-
ment decisions and, second, by intervening 
through juvenile justice policies that man-
date rehabilitation programs for delinquent 
youth and their families.
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Legal Framework: Parental Rights 
and State Authority
The U.S. legal system is based on strong 
principles of individual liberty and autonomy 
and relatively weak commitment to collective 
responsibility for the welfare of individual 
members of society. This libertarian strain in 
our political and legal history is embodied in 
constitutional parental rights doctrine elabo-
rated by the Supreme Court in the twentieth 
century. But the court has also recognized 
that parents’ authority has limits when the 
health and welfare of their children are at 
stake and, in a series of important opinions, 
it has sought to strike a balance between 
parental rights and the state’s authority to 
intervene to protect children.
Beginning with two landmark opinions in 
the 1920s, the court has held that parents 
have a liberty interest, protected under the 
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
to raise their children as they see fit, free 
from undue interference from the state. 
The early Supreme Court opinions, Meyer 
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
both dealt with state statutes seeking to limit 
parents’ freedom to guide their children’s 
education, by requiring that instruction be 
in English and that children attend pub-
lic school, respectively.3 In each case, the 
Supreme Court struck down the statute as 
unreasonable interference with the parents’ 
liberty to direct their children’s education 
and upbringing, a role that parents have 
“the right, together with the high duty” to 
perform.4 The court has been particularly 
deferential when the claim of parental rights 
is combined with a First Amendment claim 
that a state law interferes with the parents’ 
right to teach their religious faith to their 
children. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, 
the court held that Amish parents could not 
be found in violation of the state’s compul-
sory school attendance law for withdrawing 
their children from public school after the 
eighth grade to train them for their religious 
roles in the Amish community.5
The Supreme Court has also made clear that 
parental rights are not absolute.6 A statute 
that limits parental authority may be justified 
because it promotes child welfare (or social 
welfare in general) under the government’s 
police power. This was the justification for 
Progressive Era laws in the early twentieth 
century requiring school attendance and 
prohibiting child labor. The state also has the 
authority to protect the welfare of individual 
children and other vulnerable members of 
society who are unable to look out for their 
own interests. This authority is the basis for 
policies that allow the state to intervene in 
families in child maltreatment cases. 
The upshot is that parents have broad con-
stitutional authority to guide their children’s 
upbringing, subject to some constraints 
embodied in the state’s legitimate interest 
in protecting children. But the state has no 
obligation to protect children or promote 
their welfare, nor do children have a right 
to state protection. Indeed, in a famous case 
that arose in the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
held that the state had no liability when an 
abusive father grievously injured and dis-
abled his child, even when the Department 
of Social Services had been notified several 
times of the father’s abuse and failed to inter-
vene.7 Unless the state has actually taken 
a child into custody or otherwise assumed 
responsibility for her, the government has no 
duty to provide for her welfare.
Furthermore, the United States has not 
undertaken any obligation to promote 
children’s health and wellbeing under 
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international law. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), for example, states that “the fam-
ily, as the fundamental group of society and 
the natural environment for the growth and 
wellbeing of all its members and particularly 
children, should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance so that it can fully 
assume its responsibilities within the com-
munity.”8 Signatory countries have several 
obligations, including a duty to ensure that 
children have health care, adequate food, 
and education.9 Additionally, countries must 
address “all forms of physical or mental vio-
lence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment, or exploitation, 
including sexual abuse.”10 Every member 
of the United Nations has ratified the CRC 
except the United States and Somalia. The 
United States’ stance appears to express 
the libertarian values that shape its policy 
toward children generally.
Justifications for Parental  
Authority 
The constitutional framework in which 
parental rights play such a prominent 
role has shaped legal regulation of the 
parent-child relationship in many domains, 
including health care. But deference to 
parental authority under American law 
is entrenched, in part, because it is sup-
ported by pragmatic justifications as well as 
by libertarian principles. The law assumes 
that most parents love their children, are 
motivated to make decisions that promote 
their welfare, and are best positioned to 
know their needs. In this view, a parental-
rights approach ultimately promotes chil-
dren’s interests more effectively than any 
alternative. Parents’ legal authority comes 
in exchange for the responsibility that they 
bear in caring for their children and guiding 
their upbringing.11 Giving parents respon-
sibility also reduces the direct financial 
burden on and cost to society.
In health care, parents’ authority includes 
the right to consent to medical treatment 
for their children, and also the right to 
reject recommended treatment, discussed 
below. Medical decisions require informed 
consent by the patient—the ability to 
understand treatment information, com-
pare the risks and benefits of treatment 
options, and make a decision.12 Children 
are assumed to be incompetent to make 
their own treatment decisions because of 
their immaturity, and thus, under the law, 
a competent adult must provide consent. 
Because parents are presumed competent 
and know their children better than other 
adults do, the law views them as best situ-
ated to perform this function. Moreover, 
parents are financially responsible for their 
children’s health care. Parental control over 
health-care decisions is challenged only 
when parents are deficient or negligent in 
carrying out this role, or when they reveal a 
conflict of interest with their children.
The assumption that 
children can’t make their 
own treatment decisions 
is probably accurate for 
younger children, but likely 
not for teenagers.
The assumption that children can’t make 
their own treatment decisions is probably 
accurate for younger children, but likely not 
for teenagers. Indeed, research has found 
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that by age 14, adolescents’ cognitive abil-
ity to understand and reason is sufficiently 
developed that most teenagers are capable of 
making informed medical decisions.13 But in 
a legal framework based on parental rights, 
children have little autonomy, and even 
adolescents have limited authority to make 
health-care decisions. As we discuss below, 
the law has carved out some exceptions to 
this general principle, where constitutional 
interests or public health concerns are 
implicated. For routine health-care deci-
sions, however, all minors are subject to their 
parents’ legal authority, and parents must 
generally consent to treatment.
Parents’ Failure to Provide 
Medical Treatment
Parental control includes the right to 
decline as well as consent to medical treat-
ment for their children. This authority is far 
from absolute, however, and legal regula-
tion constrains parents’ authority to refuse 
or fail to obtain treatment deemed impor-
tant for their children’s health. In general, 
when parents fail in this regard, the child 
welfare system may intervene on the basis 
of child maltreatment. State statutes that 
define parental abuse or neglect usually 
include a provision that in cases of “willful 
or negligent failure of the parent or guard-
ian to provide the child with adequate … 
medical treatment,” the state may order the 
parents to obtain treatment or even remove 
the child to state custody.14 As with other 
forms of maltreatment, low-income families 
are more likely than others to be subject 
to intervention on the basis of medical 
neglect, which may be one component of 
a determination that a parent has gener-
ally failed to provide for the child’s needs. 
In these cases, the family might be offered 
help in obtaining medical treatment for the 
child, or, if the state determines that the 
parents will not provide necessary medi-
cal treatment, the child might be placed in 
foster care.15 
In striking contrast, the general legal 
response to parents who refuse to consent 
to beneficial treatment for their children 
is quite deferential. For example, the state 
can require parents to have their children 
vaccinated against communicable diseases, 
but many states are reluctant to challenge 
parents who refuse to do so.16 This has some-
times led to outbreaks of measles and other 
preventable diseases.
State deference is particularly strong when 
parents refuse to provide treatment for their 
children on religious grounds. These cases 
have been treated as a special category, 
distinct from other medical neglect cases. 
Some religious sects oppose medical treat-
ment, and members may either decline to 
obtain treatment for their children or refuse 
treatment urged by physicians. For example, 
Christian Scientists believe that physical ail-
ments should be treated by Christian Science 
practitioners rather than medical doctors.17 
These parents assert that they can refuse 
medical treatment for their children on the 
basis of their parental rights and their First 
Amendment right to raise their children in 
their religious faith.
In contrast to their response to medical 
neglect cases, legislatures and courts have 
largely respected these parents’ claims. 
For example, in response to lobbying by 
Christian Scientists and other groups, 
many states have enacted civil and criminal 
religious accommodation statutes. These 
laws define child neglect to exclude parents’ 
good-faith decisions to treat their children 
solely by spiritual means, according to the 
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tenets of an organized religion.18 Thus, such 
parents face neither liability nor the stigma 
and intrusion associated with a finding of 
child abuse or neglect. These statutes do 
not preclude the state from intervening to 
direct that a child receive medical treatment 
if nontreatment poses a serious threat to her 
life or health. But such intervention occurs 
only if the child’s condition is dire and 
becomes known to authorities. Most courts 
have found that parents who seek spiritual 
treatment bear no liability if their children 
die because the children did not receive 
medical assistance.19
A great deal of litigation has revolved around 
states’ efforts to override parental authority 
when parents refuse to allow their children 
to receive necessary medical treatment for 
religious reasons. In general, the judicial 
response has been to order treatment when 
the parents’ refusal seriously threatens the 
child’s life or is likely to have severe and 
lasting health consequences, and when the 
proposed treatment is likely to have benefi-
cial effects.20 Sometimes, courts have been 
criticized for intervening too aggressively: In 
a famous case involving a 15-year-old with 
disfiguring neurofibromatosis, the court 
ordered dangerous surgery requiring blood 
transfusions over the religious objections of 
both the mother and the child, even though 
the surgery would have been safer if post-
poned until the boy was an adult.21 But, in 
general, courts have been very deferential to 
parents’ religious objections to conventional 
medical treatment, occasionally even when 
treatment represented the only hope for a 
child’s survival. A Delaware court upheld the 
right of Christian Scientist parents to refuse 
painful chemotherapy that offered their 
young child, who suffered from Birkhett’s 
Lymphoma, a 40 percent chance of survival, 
even though he faced certain death without 
the treatment.22 Several legal scholars have 
sharply criticized this respectful approach, 
but parental rights continue to be robust in 
this context.23
How the Framework Affects 
Policy Choices
The libertarian framework, which favors 
parental rights over collective responsibility, 
influences policy making in two significant 
ways. First, without an affirmative legal 
obligation to promote children’s health, gov-
ernmental investment is optional. Although 
many children’s health programs exist, they 
are often underfunded and are vulnerable to 
budgetary and political pressures. Moreover, 
in our federalist system, broad discretion 
translates into considerable variability among 
states in children’s health programs. Second, 
the libertarian framework encourages a 
reactive rather than preventive approach to 
children’s health and wellbeing. Deference 
to parental authority has produced a sys-
tem that primarily responds to family crises 
rather than helping parents generally to raise 
healthy children. 
As Maya Rossin-Slater and Lawrence Berger 
and Sarah Font write elsewhere in this issue, 
when it comes to funding, the government 
has chosen to promote children’s health and 
family functioning through income supple-
ments such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, food voucher programs such as the 
Special Supplemental Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children, parenting support 
initiatives such as the Triple P—Positive 
Parenting Program and visiting nurse 
programs, and child development efforts 
such as Head Start. These authors show that 
many such programs effectively promote 
children’s health and wellbeing as well as 
society’s interests. 
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The authors show that many of these programs 
are also highly cost-effective. The programs 
that Rossin-Slater categorizes as intensive 
center-based early childhood care, for exam-
ple, improve both cognitive and noncognitive 
outcomes for children and have a benefit-cost 
ratio larger than one. And for every $1.00 
invested in visiting nurse programs, which cost 
$7,300 per child, society saves $5.70 in the 
long run for high-risk populations and $1.26 
for lower-risk populations.24
Indirect investments in 
children’s health and family 
wellbeing differ from state 
to state.
Despite the social and economic benefits 
of broad-based preventive programs, the 
absence of any affirmative legal obligation to 
promote children’s health means that these 
programs are vulnerable to shifting budget-
ary and political priorities. Moreover, the 
government often declines to respond to 
pressing family needs, for example, by failing 
to ensure paid parental leave or to provide 
adequate subsidies for quality child care. As 
Rossin-Slater writes in this issue, the United 
States is one of the only countries that does 
not guarantee new mothers some form of 
paid leave.25 The federal Family and Medical 
Leave Act requires employers to allow work-
ers to take up to 12 weeks to care for a new 
child or an ailing family member, but not all 
employers and employees are covered. More 
important, the leave is unpaid, which does 
not help parents who must work to support 
the family.26 Similarly, government subsidies 
for child care do not come close to satisfying 
the demand.
Additionally, the combination of optional 
government funding and the federal-
ist system of government in the United 
States means that efforts to promote chil-
dren’s health vary greatly among the states. 
Eligibility for CHIP, for example, differs 
from one state to the next. For example, 
Alabama and Oklahoma have a similar 
percentage of low-income children. But 
Alabama caps CHIP eligibility for young 
children at 300 percent of the federal pov-
erty level and Oklahoma caps eligibility at 
185 percent of the federal poverty level.27 
Indirect investments in children’s health 
and family wellbeing also differ from state 
to state. As Berger and Font explain in this 
issue, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit 
is one of the most important antipoverty pro-
grams, and it is associated with better health 
among children. Twenty-five states, the 
District of Columbia, and two localities have 
chosen to supplement the federal program 
by offering a similar tax credit, providing 
additional support for family incomes.28 But 
this means that 25 states don’t offer a state 
tax credit to low-income families. Moreover, 
the existing state programs vary in generos-
ity. Maryland’s Earned Income Tax Credit, 
for example, provides up to 50 percent of 
the federal credit and is fully refundable; 
thus, families receive a payment from the 
state government for the amount of the 
credit rather than simply an offset against 
taxes owed (a nonrefundable tax credit).29 By 
contrast, Ohio’s Earned Income Tax Credit 
is only 5 percent of the federal credit and is 
nonrefundable.30 
The federalist system certainly has advan-
tages. It allows states to experiment with 
different approaches to child health and 
wellbeing, and states can thus learn from 
one another. But the federalist system also 
Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott
184    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
allows states to offer greatly varying levels 
of support for families, and services depend 
on a state’s political values and financial 
resources, underscoring the point that 
government investment in children’s health 
is optional.
The second major policy implication of the 
libertarian framework is that it encourages 
the government to take a reactive, rather 
than preventive, approach to children’s 
health and wellbeing. Because of the impor-
tance of family autonomy, the government 
seldom intervenes in family life unless 
parents have seriously defaulted on their 
responsibility to care for their children. Of 
course, sometimes the government preempts 
parental authority, for example, through 
regulations mandating the use of car seats 
or requiring certain vaccinations, but even 
these preventive measures can be controver-
sial, at least initially. Moreover, they do not 
target particular families and are justified on 
public health grounds. 
By contrast, when parents default on their 
responsibilities, the state intervenes directly, 
and often intrusively, providing an array of 
services to the family and child. As Berger 
and Font write, the child welfare system 
profoundly affects the lives of many fami-
lies, particularly low-income and minority 
families. The child welfare system uses two 
approaches to pursue its goals of protecting 
children believed to be abused or neglected 
by their families and strengthening fami-
lies where children are at imminent risk for 
abuse and neglect.31 First, if child welfare 
officials believe a child can remain safely at 
home with additional support, the family 
receives preventive services, such as family 
or individual counseling, substance-abuse 
treatment, domestic-violence intervention, 
or parenting classes. These services aim to 
strengthen the family and keep the child 
out of foster care. But when officials deter-
mine that the child cannot remain safely in 
the home or that preventive services have 
not been effective, they follow the second 
approach: the child is placed in foster care 
with a relative, an unrelated family, or an 
institution. The state typically has a duty 
to reunite the children with their families, 
but when this is not possible, it can move to 
terminate parental rights and place the child 
with an adoptive family.
Both of these approaches to child wellbe-
ing follow a crisis-intervention model. The 
preventive services—counseling, substance 
abuse treatment, etc.—are provided only 
after the family has come to the attention of 
the authorities and the child is deemed to be 
at risk. Too often at this point, an adversarial 
relationship develops between the state and 
the family. Parents who face the threat of 
losing their children are understandably 
suspicious of state involvement. And the state 
is wary of the parents, because by the time 
intervention occurs, the functioning of at 
least one of the parents is likely at a nadir. As 
Berger and Font show, preventive services 
offered at this stage are largely ineffective. 
Most cases in the child welfare system 
involve parental neglect rather than abuse, 
among families struggling with substance 
abuse, inadequate housing, or inappropriate 
child-care arrangements.32 These problems 
may indeed threaten a child’s wellbeing, but 
the child welfare system, with its late-stage 
intervention and extreme sanction of remov-
ing children and placing them in foster care, 
often fails to adequately address the underly-
ing issues, which are grounded in poverty.
Although the crisis-intervention approach 
stems partly from the law’s respect for family 
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autonomy, in practice it offers little protec-
tion for parents who become involved in the 
child welfare system. This fact raises serious 
questions about socioeconomic discrimina-
tion. Children in the system overwhelm-
ingly come from low-income families.33 The 
fact that parental rights are constitutionally 
protected ensures that the state must meet 
a high standard of harm before it removes a 
child, but parental rights do not give parents 
a right to any state assistance before they 
face the risk of losing a child.
Even outside the child welfare system, when 
the government offers to help low-income 
parents improve their children’s health, 
the assistance often comes at a cost to 
personal autonomy and privacy. New York, 
for example, offers the Medicaid-funded 
Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP), 
which seeks to decrease infant mortality and 
increase birth weight among babies born 
to low-income mothers. But to participate 
in PCAP, low-income women must divulge 
extensive personal information that women 
with private insurance would not be required 
to tell their doctors. Women are asked ques-
tions about their immigration status, sources 
of income (including questions about crimi-
nal activity and working off the books), prior 
involvement with the child welfare system, 
and many questions about their eating habits 
and psychosocial history. Although the PCAP 
is well-intentioned, the state’s stance toward 
the participants appears to be distrustful 
rather than collaborative.34
In sum, the libertarian legal framework, with 
its emphasis on parental rights and respon-
sibilities, deeply influences programs and 
policies affecting children’s health. Because 
the government has no obligation to promote 
children’s welfare, every program is optional 
and vulnerable to the vagaries of politics. 
Under the federalist system, states are free 
to adopt widely varying levels of support for 
children’s health and wellbeing. And libertar-
ian values discourage a preventive approach 
to family welfare, despite evidence that 
preventive programs can enhance children’s 
health. Instead, the state often offers support 
only after a family hits a crisis. To be sure, 
there is much to like about a regime that 
values parental autonomy and encourages 
pluralism. But the libertarian legal frame-
work together with our federalist system 
can hinder efforts to provide comprehensive 
health services for children and families.
Adolescent Health and 
Parental Authority
Adolescents are more capable than are 
young children of making health-care deci-
sions, and once they reach the age of major-
ity at 18, they become legal adults with the 
authority and presumed competence to do 
so. Until then, as we have seen, parental 
consent is required, and parents continue to 
bear responsibility for their children’s health 
care. But there are exceptions to this gen-
eral rule, and in some treatment contexts, 
consent by adolescents to medical treatment 
is legally valid with limited or no paren-
tal involvement. Further, an adolescent’s 
refusal of treatment is occasionally given 
some weight; for example, parents’ authority 
to admit their children to inpatient psychi-
atric facilities is subject to restrictions. In 
this section, we discuss four areas in which 
the law treats adolescents differently from 
younger children: the mature minor doc-
trine; public health laws sometimes called 
minors’ consent statutes; minor’s refusal of 
treatment; and the right of access to repro-
ductive health services, including abortion 
and contraception. In each setting, for dif-
ferent reasons, parental involvement in their 
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children’s health-care decisions is deemed 
unnecessary or is restricted. Sometimes, 
mature minors’ consent is deemed legally 
adequate to shield physicians from liability. 
Occasionally, parental authority is limited 
because the parent and child may have a 
conflict of interest (as when parents seek 
to admit children to psychiatric facili-
ties); in other situations, a parental consent 
requirement might deter adolescents from 
seeking needed services, and public health 
concerns favor letting them get treatment 
without involving parents (minors’ consent 
laws). Finally, abortion decisions represent a 
unique category of health-care decisions that 
involve key constitutional values.
The Mature Minor Doctrine 
Under the long-recognized mature minor 
rule, parental consent to medical treatment 
is sometimes deemed unnecessary for ado-
lescents mature enough to make their own 
decisions.35 Courts developed the mature 
minor doctrine to protect physicians from 
legal liability when they treat minors under 
circumstances in which obtaining parental 
consent is either impossible or difficult and 
waiting to provide treatment would be risky. 
A physician who fails to obtain informed 
consent before providing treatment can incur 
legal liability for committing a battery on the 
patient. Because minors are presumed to be 
incompetent to make informed treatment 
decisions, treating physicians could incur tort 
liability for providing treatment without valid 
parental consent. Mature minor doctrine 
recognizes that the presumption of incom-
petence as applied to older minors is based 
more on administrative convenience than on 
scientific reality. 
When is the mature minor doctrine applied? 
Courts have focused on the following factors 
in concluding that parental consent is not 
necessary: 1) The treatment must be under-
taken for the benefit of the minor; 2) the 
minor must be mature enough to under-
stand the procedure and its consequences; 
and 3) the procedure cannot be of a serious 
nature (except for emergency treatment).36 
In the case of a serious procedure, parents 
should be consulted or a guardian appointed. 
The mature minor doctrine indirectly 
acknowledges that adolescents are competent 
to make medical decisions, but it should not 
be understood to confer “rights” on teenag-
ers on this basis. The doctrine’s purpose is 
to protect physicians from liability if parents 
later bring suit against them on the grounds 
that informed consent was not obtained 
before the teen was treated. The mature 
minor doctrine is also not a general rule 
authorizing adolescents’ consent, although 
a recent study found that physicians believe 
this is the case.37 Instead, the adolescent’s 
consent constitutes a valid substitute for the 
absent parent only under limited conditions.
Minor Consent Statutes
Many states have enacted minor consent 
statutes that allow minors to obtain particu-
lar health-care services without parental 
consent or involvement.38 These services 
typically include outpatient treatment for 
substance abuse; outpatient mental health 
therapy; treatment for sexually transmitted 
diseases; and contraceptive, pregnancy, and 
family planning services. Although such stat-
utes do not explicitly target adolescents, the 
nature of the designated treatments is such 
that application to younger children would 
be unusual. Thus, presumably, most patients 
who obtain treatment under such statutes are 
likely competent to consent to treatment. 
The primary purpose of these statutes is not 
to protect physicians from liability (although 
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they in fact do so) or to expand adolescents’ 
rights. Instead, minor consent statutes have 
an important public health purpose—they 
encourage teenagers to get treatment 
that they might be deterred from seeking 
if parental consent or involvement were 
required. These sensitive treatments involve 
private concerns and behaviors that adoles-
cents may be loath to share with parents. At 
one level, the statutes recognize and respect 
individual privacy, but their purpose is also 
pragmatic. Society has an important interest 
in contraceptive use by teenagers who are 
sexually active and in appropriate treatment 
for those who have STDs or substance abuse 
problems—both for their own welfare and 
that of society. Legislatures enacting these 
statutes believe that removing obstacles to 
treatment in these cases serves both public 
health and teen welfare goals. Further, even 
if most parents likely would help their teen-
ager obtain these sensitive treatments, the 
intuition is that some might not, and the laws 
allow children to receive treatments without 
confronting their parents’ objections.
Adolescents’ Refusal of Treatment
Parents’ general authority is sometimes 
restricted either because the parent seek-
ing treatment may have a conflict of interest 
with the child or because the adolescent 
child objects to the treatment. Both of these 
elements may be present when parents seek 
admission to inpatient psychiatric facilities 
for their children. Psychiatric hospitalization 
generally is assumed to differ from conven-
tional medical treatment because it often 
involves restrictions on personal liberty to 
protect mentally ill patients from harming 
themselves or others. For these reasons, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, state lawmakers, partly 
responding to constitutional concerns raised 
by the Supreme Court, greatly reduced 
long-term institutionalization of mentally ill 
people and restricted involuntary commit-
ment.39 These policies indirectly affected 
parents’ authority to admit their children to 
psychiatric hospitals. 
A conflict of interest may arise when a par-
ent’s decision to place a child in an inpatient 
facility is prompted by the child’s disruptive 
and perhaps offensive behavior rather than a 
serious mental illness. In response, lawmak-
ers have created special regulations that apply 
to parents’ decisions to admit their children 
to psychiatric hospitals. Most importantly, in 
1979, the Supreme Court held that because 
minors have a liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily and not being subject 
to the stigma of inappropriate placement, spe-
cial procedures are required to admit minors 
to inpatient psychiatric treatment.40 The court 
decreed that a neutral fact finder (who could 
be a psychiatrist not involved with the minor’s 
treatment) must confirm that institutional 
placement is medically indicated; the court 
also required an independent review after 
an initial period of treatment to determine 
whether continued commitment is necessary. 
Some states have required more rigorous 
procedures when an adolescent objects to psy-
chiatric hospitalization, such as appointing an 
attorney to represent the minor in a judicial 
hearing. Further, in some states, the standard 
for involuntary commitment is adapted from 
the standard applied to adults—the minor 
must present a serious danger to himself or 
others or be unable to care for himself in an 
age-appropriate manner.41
Sex Education and 
Reproductive Services
Minors’ access to sex education and repro-
ductive health services—and particularly 
to abortion—has generated far more politi-
cal controversy than other issues affecting 
children’s health care. On the one hand, 
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some religious and political advocates argue 
that sexual activity should be reserved for 
marriage and generally view teenage sexual 
activity as immoral; many oppose minors’ 
access to abortion as well. Those who hold 
these views also often believe that parents’ 
authority in this realm is critically important. 
In their eyes, sex education is the parents’ 
role, and teenagers need parental guidance 
when they make decisions about sexual 
behavior. Thus they oppose sex education in 
public schools and object to the notion that 
teens have a right of privacy. On the other 
hand, pragmatic public health advocates and 
others assume that teenage sexual activ-
ity is inevitable and see reducing teenage 
pregnancy as a major policy goal. From this 
perspective, the most effective way to reduce 
teenage pregnancy and limit the need for 
abortion is to provide comprehensive sex 
education and make contraceptive services 
readily available to teenagers. In this view, 
abortion should be available to pregnant 
minors to avoid teenage childbearing and 
rearing, but avoiding teen pregnancy alto-
gether is the primary policy goal. 
Since public schools began to offer sex edu-
cation classes in the 1970s, some religious 
parents have objected on the ground that the 
instruction conflicts with the religious and 
moral values that they want their children to 
learn, and that the state is interfering with 
a parental prerogative. In response, many 
school districts have voluntarily established 
policies allowing parents to exempt their 
children from classes and programs that 
deal directly or indirectly with sexuality. 
When school districts have declined to do so, 
courts have been divided on the question of 
whether parents have a constitutional right 
to exempt their children from exposure to 
material that they find offensive on grounds 
of their religious faith. Increasingly, courts 
have rejected parents’ claims, pointing to 
public schools’ broad discretion to control 
curriculum, as well as to the state’s sub-
stantial public health interest in combating 
AIDS, other STDs, and teenage pregnancy.42 
As public schools have become the forum for 
instruction on important public health issues, 
parental rights have been accorded less 
weight in that context.
As public schools have become 
the forum for instruction 
on important public health 
issues, parental rights have 
been accorded less weight in 
that context.
The battle over contraception has also largely 
been won by public health advocates. Teen 
pregnancy has declined in recent years, but 
its costs to the young parents, their children, 
and society are substantial. Teenage parents’ 
educational attainment and socioeconomic 
status are lower than that of people who 
postpone childbearing into their twenties, 
and their children have lower educational 
achievement and poorer health than do chil-
dren born to older parents.43 Many states now 
have statutes (sometimes as part of broader 
minor consent statutes, described above) 
allowing minors to obtain contraceptive ser-
vices without parental consent. Making con-
traceptives available through public school 
nurses’ offices has been more controversial, 
though some urban public school systems 
allow high school students to get contracep-
tives this way, often with the provision that 
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parents can exclude their children by signing 
a form.44 Many experts believe that poli-
cies making it easy for teenagers to obtain 
contraceptives, together with neutral educa-
tional programs that tell them how to avoid 
pregnancy, have played a major role in the 
dramatic reduction in teenage pregnancy and 
childbearing over the past decade.45 
Independent access to abortion by pregnant 
minors continues to be far more contentious. 
Currently, minors who are willing to involve 
their parents can obtain abortions subject 
only to the restrictions that have been found 
legally acceptable for adult women. The 
disputes arise when states restrict minors’ 
ability to get an abortion without parental 
consent or involvement. In general, although 
the political and legal debate is often framed 
in terms of parental rights or teen welfare, 
the issue of minors’ access to abortion also 
represents another setting in which the right 
to abortion itself is disputed; advocates for 
restricting access for minors often oppose 
abortion altogether.
Abortion decisions are distinctive in many 
ways. The issue is constitutionally important, 
of course; partly for this reason, many see 
the decision to get an abortion as fundamen-
tally different from routine medical deci-
sions that require parental consent. Parents 
may have a conflict of interest with their 
pregnant daughter, because of their views 
either about abortion or about her sexual 
activity and pregnancy; minors may fear their 
parents’ anger or objection to the abortion.46 
Moreover, abortion (like other reproductive 
decisions) involves a private and sensitive 
matter that adolescents may be reluctant to 
discuss with their parents. Finally, the teen-
ager considering an abortion will become a 
parent if the pregnancy is not terminated, 
making her status as a minor subject to her 
parents’ authority somewhat discordant. 
Since it decided Roe v. Wade in 1972, the 
Supreme Court, in several opinions, has 
examined the constitutionality of state 
statutes that restrict minors’ access to abor-
tion by requiring either parental consent or 
parental notification.47 In these decisions, the 
court has sought to balance the reproductive 
rights of pregnant teenagers against the par-
ents’ right to be involved in important deci-
sions affecting their children’s welfare, while 
also recognizing the independent interest of 
the state in the welfare of minors.
In Bellotti v. Baird, a landmark 1979 deci-
sion, the court provided a framework for 
regulating minors’ access to abortion in 
states seeking to design a constitutionally 
acceptable process that accommodates some 
level of parental involvement.48 In Bellotti, 
the court reiterated that pregnant minors 
have constitutionally protected reproduc-
tive rights, but it held that the state may 
limit minors’ rights to a greater extent than 
would be acceptable for adult women.49 The 
court justified such limits on three grounds: 
minors’ greater vulnerability and need for 
protection; their lack of the “experience, 
perspective and judgment” needed to make 
sound decisions; and parents’ constitutionally 
protected authority to guide their children’s 
upbringing. Bellotti held that a state may 
require parental consent to abortion, but it 
must also provide an alternative procedure 
in which a minor can demonstrate that she is 
mature enough to make the decision with-
out her parents’ consent. If a minor is found 
to lack the requisite maturity, the judge 
(or other designated official) should decide 
whether abortion without parental consent is 
in her best interest. Thus, under the court’s 
Clare Huntington and Elizabeth Scott
190    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
guidelines, parental consent to abortion 
should be required only when it is in the 
minor’s interest. 
The Supreme Court has also upheld statutes 
that require parental notification (but not 
consent) before a minor can get an abortion.50 
In theory, these statutes infringe less on the 
pregnant minor’s rights, because parents, 
once notified, lack the authority to block the 
abortion by withholding consent. But the 
prospect of notifying their parents consti-
tutes a major deterrent for many teenagers, 
who fear their parents’ response.51 Although 
the court did not explicitly exclude mature 
minors from the notification requirement, 
most states have established a procedure by 
which mature minors can avoid notification.
Some states do not distinguish between 
pregnant minors and adults, allowing minors 
to consent to abortion without parental 
consent or notification. But a majority of 
states have responded to the Supreme Court 
decisions by enacting statutes that establish 
judicial bypass hearings, in which a judge 
can evaluate the maturity and (sometimes) 
best interest of the minor seeking abortion 
without involving the parents.52 The Supreme 
Court did not provide any criteria to guide 
judges in evaluating whether a minor is 
“mature enough and well enough informed 
to make the abortion decision independently 
of her parents’ wishes,” or whether abortion 
without parental consent would be in her 
best interest.53 Thus courts have broad dis-
cretion to interpret these terms and to apply 
the constitutionally mandated requirements. 
Implementation of statutes requiring judicial 
bypass proceedings and the obstacles facing 
minors who seek abortions vary considerably 
across and even within states. In some states, 
each minor is provided an attorney to assist 
her in the hearing (often through the pro 
bono services of bar associations); in other 
states, teenagers receive little assistance.54 
Further, courts take different approaches 
to evaluating the maturity of petitioning 
minors. Some courts focus narrowly on the 
minor’s basic understanding of the medical 
procedure and its consequences, while others 
undertake a broad evaluation of the minor’s 
maturity. Courts that use the latter approach 
are more likely to find the minor “imma-
ture,” pointing to such factors as her financial 
dependence on her parents, nervousness in 
the hearing, and even carelessness in engag-
ing in unprotected sex.55 The outcomes of 
these proceedings also vary in different 
areas, although most petitions are granted. 
In Massachusetts, a study found that judges 
virtually always approve the minor’s peti-
tion, either finding her sufficiently mature 
to make the decision or concluding that the 
abortion is in her best interest.56 Courts 
in other states, applying rigorous maturity 
criteria, reject some petitions; more impor-
tantly, they likely deter some pregnant teens 
from petitioning in a timely manner, or at all. 
Further, in some areas, bypass proceedings 
and abortion facilities may not be available 
near a minor’s home—a greater impediment 
to access for minors than for adults. 
Many legal scholars have criticized judicial 
bypass proceedings for creating burdensome 
obstacles for pregnant teenagers, many of 
whom are already experiencing extraordinary 
stress.57 The procedure itself creates delay, 
sometimes increasing the risk of the abor-
tion. Moreover, although bypass hearings 
are supposed to be confidential, petitioning 
teens must reveal in court the very intimate 
facts of their sexual activity and condition, 
as well other highly personal information. As 
legal scholar Carol Sanger has put it, bypass 
hearings, despite their purportedly benign 
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purposes, can serve as a form of punishment 
for pregnant teens.58
Treatment in the Juvenile 
Justice System
When juveniles commit a crime and are 
adjudicated delinquent, they are subject to 
the authority of the juvenile justice sys-
tem. As part of their disposition, they may 
be required to participate in rehabilitative 
treatment. This treatment aims to reduce the 
risk of reoffending and to promote healthy 
psychological development, increasing the 
likelihood that delinquent youths will mature 
into productive adults. Moreover, adolescents 
in the justice system are more likely to suf-
fer from untreated mental health problems 
than are youths not involved in the sys-
tem, including depression, attention deficit 
disorders and substance abuse problems. 
Diagnosing and treating these problems is 
often essential to rehabilitation. The parents 
of delinquent youths may also be required 
to participate in treatment programs on the 
well-substantiated theory that parents and 
family may directly or indirectly contribute 
to adolescents’ criminal activity and are often 
critically important to rehabilitation.59 
In the early twenty-first century, juvenile 
justice policy has undergone a major shift 
toward a more rehabilitative approach, sup-
ported by a growing consensus that juve-
nile offenders, due to their developmental 
immaturity, differ in important ways from 
their adult counterparts, and that, for most 
young offenders, treatment is more effective 
than harsh punishment in furthering the 
law’s goal of reducing reoffending. This trend 
represents a departure from the punitive 
policies of the 1990s, when elevated rates of 
juvenile crime led many states to enact laws 
making it easier to prosecute and punish 
juveniles as adults. In the juvenile system 
also, incarceration became the norm.60 In 
part, the momentum behind the recent reha-
bilitative trend comes from a growing body 
of evidence that incarcerated youths have 
high recidivism rates and that some commu-
nity-based programs not only cost less than 
incarceration but are quite effective at reduc-
ing reoffending.61 Moreover, research in 
developmental neuroscience and psychology 
has reinvigorated the traditional assumptions 
about youthful immaturity and the potential 
of young offenders to reform that animated 
juvenile courts for much of the twentieth 
century but fell out of favor in the 1990s. 
Many states have embraced this research, 
as well as an evidence-based approach 
to juvenile crime regulation, and have 
diverted resources from state institutions 
to  community-based correctional programs 
that are  tailored to the needs of adoles-
cent offenders. In New York, for example, a 
governor’s task force in 2009 issued a scath-
ing report describing abusive conditions 
and lack of treatment in juvenile institu-
tions, most of which were far from offend-
ers’ homes.62 In response to the report and 
other investigations, New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg announced that city 
youths would no longer be sent to these 
facilities. Many have been closed, with youths 
being sent to smaller therapeutic programs 
in their communities.63 In 2013, a National 
Academy of Sciences committee issued a 
National Research Council report advocat-
ing a developmentally informed, research-
based approach to juvenile justice policy.64 
The report cites a large body of research in 
strongly recommending that most youths be 
treated in rehabilitative programs in the com-
munity, that those who require residential 
treatment be placed in small facilities near 
their homes, and that parents play a key role 
in treatment. 
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The most effective correctional treatment 
programs seek to encourage healthy psychoso-
cial development by giving juvenile offenders 
developmental tools and support in their social 
context. A critical dimension of treatment in 
most programs, as the NRC report suggests, 
is parents’ participation, even for youths in 
residential facilities. Experts on adolescent 
development emphasize that authoritative 
parent figures are important to psychoso-
cial maturation, and parents are frequently 
directed by juvenile court judges to participate 
in treatment programs. Thus parents whose 
children are in the justice system do not 
enjoy the deference to parental authority that 
other parents enjoy. Parental involvement is 
a core component of tested programs such as 
Functional Family Therapy, Multi-dimensional 
Treatment Foster Care, and Multisystemic 
Therapy (MST).65 
MST is thoroughly grounded in developmental 
knowledge and is one of the most effective 
treatment programs for adolescent offenders; it 
has been carefully evaluated for more than 20 
years with a broad range of offenders.66 MST 
combines cognitive behavioral therapy with an 
ecological approach that deals with individual 
youths in the multiple social contexts that they 
inhabit—their families, peer groups, schools, 
and communities. It focuses on giving parents 
the skills and resources they need to avoid 
problem behaviors, and it helps delinquent 
youths cope with family, peer, and school prob-
lems that contribute to their criminal activity. 
The success of MST and other programs in 
reducing recidivism has been instrumental in 
creating support for a community-based reha-
bilitative approach to juvenile justice policy. 
Diagnosing and treating mental health 
problems of youth in the justice system has 
taken on greater urgency in recent years, 
with growing evidence that many delinquent 
youths suffer from mental health condi-
tions that likely contribute to their criminal 
activity. For example, a major study that 
followed teen offenders over time has found 
a high correlation between youthful reof-
fending and substance abuse, suggesting 
that effective treatment of offenders’ drug 
and alcohol problems may reduce recidivism 
rates. Many offenders in the study received 
substance abuse treatment in juvenile facili-
ties, but treatment was less common in the 
community. The researchers found that 
substance abuse treatment in the justice 
system reduced both substance abuse and 
recidivism, but only when the treatment 
lasted for a substantial period and involved 
the parents.67
In recent years, the juvenile justice sys-
tem has responded more effectively to the 
mental health problems (including substance 
abuse) of youths in the system with a simple, 
accurate, and inexpensive screening test. The 
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument, 
developed by psychologist Thomas Grisso 
and psychiatrist Richard Barnum, is now 
widely used in juvenile detention centers and 
has been credited with reducing suicides and 
increasing diagnosis and treatment of juve-
nile offenders’ mental health problems.68
The recent focus on treatment and rehabili-
tation of juvenile offenders is both pater-
nalistic and pragmatic. A growing body of 
research in developmental psychology and 
brain science has persuaded many people 
that harsh adult punishment for adolescents 
is usually inappropriate, and likely more 
harmful to youths than to adult criminals.69 
But support for a rehabilitative approach to 
youthful offending also comes from evidence 
that it is more effective in reducing recidi-
vism than the punitive sentencing policies 
of the 1990s. Thus, as in other areas of legal 
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regulation, social welfare, and not simply the 
welfare of minors, guides policy in response 
to issues of children’s health.
A rehabilitative approach to juvenile crime 
is both less costly and likely more effective 
than incarceration-based policies. But like 
intervention in child maltreatment cases, 
juvenile justice dispositions represent a form 
of crisis intervention—the approach adopted 
by our libertarian legal system. As we have 
indicated, early childhood prevention pro-
grams that offer support to families and 
children have been shown to reduce adoles-
cent offending and to produce other posi-
tive outcomes. Greater use of programs and 
policies that provide health care and other 
services—especially mental health services—
to younger children and their families might 
reduce problem behavior in adolescence, and 
at a lower social cost than society incurs in 
responding to juvenile crime.
Conclusions
The libertarian legal framework that 
regulates children’s health care in the 
United States—protecting parental rights 
while taking a hands-off approach to child 
wellbeing—has important consequences for 
policy. Unlike other developed countries, 
the United States has not undertaken an 
affirmative legal obligation to ensure chil-
dren’s health and wellbeing. This lack of a 
legal mandate to invest in family function-
ing and child health puts the onus on policy 
makers, researchers, and advocates to build 
public and political support for policies 
promoting child and family welfare. To do 
so, and to overcome philosophical opposi-
tion, requires persuasive arguments that 
investments in children’s health will not 
only benefit children but will also promote 
social welfare.
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